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Introduction |   
 
Language first emerged as a philosophical topic in Ancient Greece when Plato 
initiated the question of how things in the universe came by their names. With the 
subsequent development of Aristotelian nominalism, objects came to be understood and 
named according to a commonality of forms. Both thinkers focused on language as it 
provided man with his ability to communicate and designate things both in themselves 
and as they were perceived. However, it was Aristotle’s phenomenology that would serve 
to inspire Martin Heidegger’s study of Being and language’s role in its origination and 
perpetuation. 
Language is generally conceived of as the medium through which man performs 
both written and verbal communication, though there are many differing perspectives to 
consider when approaching a study of the essence of language. On one hand, speech is 
most essential; on the other, the essential moment is the thought that precedes speech. 
Some hold that the essence of language dwells within the speaker, while for others it is 
the interaction between speaker and listener. Speaking may be either a passive 
participation in vocalizing the soul’s sentiments or it may be a system in which every 
word is a sign. However, all will agree that language is the only way for man to clearly 
materialize his thoughts to others, to characterize his reality, and to communicate his 
ideals.  
As Aristotle wrote in On Interpretation, 
 “Spoken words are the signs of the soul’s experiences, and written words 
are the signs of spoken words. Just as all men have not the same speech 
sounds; but the soul’s experiences, which they immediately signify, are 




In this conception, the essence of language is the element of commonality that successful 
communication presupposes. If language is a totality of these elements that Aristotle 
                                                        
1 Joseph J. Kockelmans, “Language, Meaning, and Ek-sistence,” in On Heidegger and Language, 




identifies, then the act of processing that occurs in the time between the identification of 
the soul’s sentiments and their communication through utterance is the significant 
moment, whether or not it is a conscious moment. What is revealed in this moment just 
prior to utterance is presupposed to be common to all, but what is it that is revealed?  For 
Martin Heidegger, this moment is a bringing to the fore, an unconcealment that has the 
potential to elucidate the truth of Being.  
Martin Heidegger was born in the conservative, rural town of Messkirch, 
Germany in 1889. Though he began his academic career studying theology at the 
University of Freiberg, he took up philosophy in 1911 and began teaching at the 
University four years later. Heidegger’s early philosophical engagements were motivated 
by his readings of Aristotle’s metaphysical questionings. Aristotle sought to discover 
what it is that unites all modes of being, and Heidegger’s dedication to studying the 
nature of being was inspired and driven by this philosophy. His studies in 
phenomenology took place under Edmund Husserl, who had developed the bracketing 
method of epoché, or a phenomenological reduction that involves suspending the natural 
attitude toward our perception of the material external world. He held that by bracketing, 
it is possible to attend to the contents of the nature of your experience. During his early 
years as Husserl’s assistant at Freiburg, Heidegger would gain a close enough 
understanding of his mentor’s phenomenological position to wholly reject it.  
Martin Heidegger’s philosophical career is not without incriminating political 
implications. He joined the Nazi Party in 1933 as Rector of the University of Freiburg, 
which, according to popular belief, enabled him to establish Nazi educational policies in 
the classrooms. Though he resigned from his position as Rector a year later and distanced 
himself from National Socialist politics, a denazification committee at the university 
banned him from teaching until 1949.  
Through his critical studies of Kant, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Husserl, 
Heidegger formulated the basis for Being and Time (Sein und Zeit), which was published 
in 1927 long before his ousting and is now held among the most significant texts of 
contemporary Continental Philosophy. The text, dedicated to Edmund Husserl in 
friendship and admiration, is lengthy, complicated, and characterized by unfamiliar 




communicate forms that Heidegger believed conventional language was unable to 
articulate. For Heidegger, if the ability to perform a phenomenological analysis comes 
before consciousness of objects, then it seems that the language used to articulate this 
primordial ability must predate the language of previous ontological studies. This is why 
he rejects the language of Husserlian formal ontology, replacing ideas such as 
transcendental consciousness and intentionality with terms like Dasein and Being-in-the-
world. The new terminology leads the reader to re-think his own understanding of 
concepts in terms of Heideggerian Leitworte, or leading words, and to become more 
conscious of the implications that accompany each of his utterances. 
A phenomenological view of language carries the presupposition that language is 
primarily driven by the meaning that the speaker intends and his audience perceives. By 
this, the phenomenological view also maintains that man’s primary drive as a speaking 
being is to participate in meaning-giving. Heidegger’s theory of language places an 
emphasis on poetry and calls for a complete illumination of man’s existence through the 
revealing of inherent meaning that poetry allows. His writings on poetry were largely 
based on his exegetical reading of the German Romantic poet Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-
1843). His reading of Hölderlin’s poetry illustrates his belief that an instrumental 
approach to language will fail to communicate being in the truthful way that the language 
of poetry can communicate being. Heidegger presents a new approach to understanding 
characterized by a repudiation of the language of technology and a renewed emphasis on 
intrinsic value, which requires a rejection of the modern subject.  
 In this paper, I will introduce Heidegger’s take on the question of being and the 
ways in which it leads to a repudiation of both Cartesian subjectivity and the instrumental 
values it promotes in his opus, Being and Time. In the first chapter, I will explicate 
Heidegger’s idea of the presence of truth in art and art’s potential to allow truth to be 
uncovered, as he writes in The Origin of the Work of Art. In the second chapter, I will go 
on to show that Heidegger believed poetry to have the same truth revealing capabilities as 
great art. In his essays What Are Poets For? and Language, Heidegger places man in a 
dark era of technological dominance before he posits that the language of great poetry 




truth. He maintains that use of language in this way does not rely on the presence of a 
subject.   
 Finally, I will point out the objections posed by Theodor Adorno (1903-1960) in 
Parataxis and The Jargon of Authenticity and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe (1940-2007) in 
Heidegger and the Politics of Poetry. While Adorno’s perspective leads him to disagree 
with Heidegger’s failure to recognize the historical and conceptual differences between 
poetry and the essay as form, Lacoue-Labarthe argues that his combination of poetry, 
origin, and being is politically motivated and therefore problematic. Adorno takes issue 
with Heidegger’s abandonment of modern subjectivity and argues that subjectivity is 
located within man’s ability to express beyond designations. Lacoue-Labarthe finds 
Heidegger’s “fascist” manipulation of Hölderlin to be problematic in the context of his 
involvement in the National Socialist political climate. For both thinkers, Heidegger’s 
blend of poetry and philosophy remains an issue.   
  It seems to me that poetry’s place on the spectrum of expression between the 
semiotic and the explicit means that the very qualities which convince some of its 
potential to effectively convey meaning and communicate truth render it problematic for 
others. The question of poetry’s ability to communicate intrinsic meaning is an important 
subject for questioning, as Heidegger’s critics have proven by taking up his work in the 
first place.  Though they attack the implications of a return to the scattered syntax of the 
great poets, if we are to ignore poetry’s unique structures, we are left with nostalgia for 
the intrinsic tenets of being-in-the-world that are passed over by a wholly technical 
understanding of language. As I explore the differences between the idea of the self that 
Heidegger sees illuminated by poetry and the limitations of the modern subject, I hope to 
reveal that Heidegger’s aim is not to reconstitute the world from a poetic perspective but 
rather to restore the ontological through an engagement with what already is.  Ultimately, 
I hope to show why the language of poetry figures so prominently in both Heidegger’s 





1 | Articulating Being 
 
 
 In Being and Time, Heidegger undertakes a phenomenological study in an effort 
to discover meaning in man’s encounters with objects. His project is to uncover the 
meaning and mystery of Being itself rather than the meaning of particular, individual 
beings. What he is truly seeking to elucidate is what it means for an entity to be an entity. 
My first thought upon being confronted with this question was: If I am, as I have never 
had reason to doubt, a human and therefore representative of an individual entity, should 
I not have the power to articulate what being an entity means to me? It seems that for 
Heidegger, I will fail to discover the answer in a meaningful way unless I refocus my 
examination. Rather than investigating the nature of an ‘entity’, man should study the 
nature of being. To give an example:  if the book is on the table, what is is?  
 As a reader, and a being, I find it easy to ask why I have never found the need to 
confront this issue before. If I operate among and assert about other beings all the time, 
why should I approach the topic of being in the first place? Heidegger seems to suggest 
that I have never previously been confronted with my lack of understanding because I 
already possess some basic, pre-ontological concept of being. He aims to convert this 
basic notion into a more explicit ontological understanding in order to avoid the 
incompleteness of Husserl’s ontic matters and the traps of Cartesian dualism. We should 
be able to do this, as Heidegger points out, because if we have the capacity to pose the 
question of what is is in the first place, we should also possess the faculties to find the 
answer within our consciousness. As he writes in Being and Time, “Dasein is an entity 
which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the 
fact that, in its very being, that being is an issue for it.”
2
 
 In order to avoid perpetuating the contamination of his discussion of Being with 
the language of Cartesian dualism, Heidegger presents the notion of Dasein, or explicit, 
pre-ontological being-there, and avoids a discussion of the biological body altogether. 
Dasein can also be considered the clearing of being where all facets of objects become 
plainly apparent to human experience. Use of the term Dasein allows Heidegger to 
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convey both form and presence and to imply the necessity of a being’s discursive 
engagement in the world and his own realm. Heidegger’s emphasis on the necessity of 
practical engagement illustrates his belief that man finds meaning through using and 
making rather than through studying and knowing. This aspect of his writings is distinctly 
un-Cartesian in that it rejects the famous notion, Cogito ergo sum. However, that is not to 
say that Heidegger has truly escaped the pitfalls of mind/body dualism by simply 
avoiding the use of certain terms or demoting thought from its Cartesian position as 
existence-determiner.  
 Critics ask how Heidegger can imply that embodiment is not an essential part of 
the structure of Dasein while simultaneously putting forth the idea that Dasein is never 
without a body. It seems that the ‘body’ necessary for Dasein may be present in other 
objects, both ready-to-hand and present-at-hand, rather than in human form. If the 
essence of Dasein is existence rather than form, and it exists in relation to outside objects, 
it can be expressed without reference to its ontic properties. This brings to mind the 
notions of spatiality and perspective seen in Husserl’s writings in relation to ontic objects. 
Dasein is not in the world like water in a glass, rather it encompasses the world and is 
subsumed by it at the same time. It dwells in the world and allows for ek-sistence. Man’s 
Being is disclosed to him by the being-towards that characterizes ek-sistence.  In Being 
and Time, language is derived from the disclosedness of man’s existence. It plays an 
essential role in self-realization, as man must decide how to act within his thrownness. 
Without language, there would be no world in the Heideggerian sense of average-
everydayness, as the being of objects would have no conveyable meaning. 
 Now, as David Cerbone points out in his article, Heidegger and Dasein’s ‘Bodily 
Nature’, we are met with the problem that man is merely a shell filled with this being-in-
the-world, and our earlier problems with mind/body dualism have just been re-
categorized and put to the side. Is the body now a just presence-at-hand distilled down to 
its instrumental value or is it something more? As Cerbone writes,  
“Raising my arm, for example, treated as a mere bodily movement, can 
be described in the languages of physics and biology, as the motion of 
something with such and such mass with various goings-on at the 




capture the significance of the movement: I may, for example, be 
raising my arm to ask a question at a colloquium, to wave to a friend, 
or to drive a nail into a piece of wood.” 
3
 
It is obvious from this example that Heidegger does not mean the body is merely present-
at-hand. However, is it ready-to-hand, like his example of the hammer? Is the body the 
equipment of being-in-the-world? The body is clearly a relational tool, that is, it is used 
for-the-sake-of, toward-which, with-which, etc. The body is also an integrated tool, as the 
arm is integrated with the torso, which is integrated with the neck and organs and so on. 
A Being is also capable of seamlessly drawing upon its own relational abilities and the 
integrated nature of its form, and often without any conscious attention.  
 However, another look shows that body parts are no more ready-to-hand than they 
are present-to-hand. A human body can only be directly utilized by that individual, and 
the body becomes incorporated with the self in the way a hammer never could. As 
Cerbone points out, it is different to lend a hand than to lend a hammer. For Heidegger, 
body parts are incorporated while equipment is not. Equipment is characterized by 
readiness, while body parts possess a certain ‘capacity’ that seems to be more constant, as 
it is dependent on integration. A hammer can gather dust in a shed, but a hand is called 
upon at all times for various crucial purposes.
4
  
 Traditional metaphysics has so far been unable to think of the lived body, as 
Heidegger sought to define it. Although it is possible to come to an understanding of the 
nature of motility and gesturing as physical and biological properties of the natural body, 
we have yet to find a way to ontologically reconcile our natural body with our lived body. 
It appears that the closest Heidegger gets to a reconciliation of the two is when he speaks 
in terms of “embodiment”. As David Kleinberg-Levin points out in his text, this term 
“carries us past the inveterate tendency to reify what we are trying to think and 
understand and engage”.
5
 Now we can speak of Dasein in a dynamic way without 
                                                        
3 David Cerbone, “Heidegger and Dasein’s ‘Bodily Nature’”, in in Donn Welton (ed.), The Body: 
Classic and Contemporary Readings, in Simon Critchley (Series Editor), Blackwell Readings in 
Continental Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), 217. 
4 Cerbone, “Heidegger and Dasein’s Bodily Nature”, 113-114. 
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 David Kleinberg-Levin "The Ontological Dimension of Embodiment: Heidegger's Thinking of 
Being," in Donn Welton (ed.), The Body: Classic and Contemporary Readings, in Simon Critchley (Series 




referring to it as a physical object, and we can gain a clearer picture of the ontological 
aspect of our embodied experiences. 
 As Kleinberg- Levin illustrates, our task as beings is to seek to “redeem” our pre-
ontological understanding through a hermeneutical approach to our embodied 
experiences. The most effective way to achieve this is to be conscious of all gestures, 
moods, and experiences as they exemplify openness and participate in a questioning of 
the intrinsic value inherent to existence itself through everyday living. Man must be open 
to all that which is ‘other’, as this openness seems to be constitutive of man’s ontological 
embodiment. An ongoing appreciation of ontological being can be maintained by heeding 
the call to openness, as that is the deepest level of awareness. It seems that Heidegger 
believes himself to have reconciled the problem of mind/body dualism by asserting that 
Dasein is ontically constituted by Being-in-the-World but that Dasein also is the 
ontological embodiment of our openness-to-being. This hermeneutic approach to an 
explanation of Dasein communicates the struggle of articulating Being. The original 
language of Heidegger’s text appears to mirror the relationship between Dasein and the 
world, as his leading words, or Leitworte, act as an illustration of the kind of usable, 
active attitude about existence he is trying to convey.  
 Heidegger’s idea that Being can extend beyond the epistemological to the 
ontological allows him to get closer to certainty about the nature of the lived body by 
considering existence in its earliest form. This existential analytic provides a clearer 
phenomenological description of the lived body’s encounters with the world. Whereas 
Rene Descartes presented a world full of objects waiting to be encountered in present-at-
hand form as mere structures, and Edmund Husserl focused on appearances and 
sensations, Heidegger’s world of readiness-to-hand allows a deeper level of constant 
connection between the self and the world. He defies the spatiality that Descartes and 
Husserl both relied upon, and instead of isolating the subjective consciousness he 
dissolves its autonomy it by throwing it out into the world to relate to all things.   
 In his later writings, Heidegger would maintain his engagement with the problem 
of how to gain an ontological understanding of Being. He concerned himself with 
language in order to locate a foundation for its basic assumptions and reinterpret it in 




system of signs and symbols in Being and Time, he goes on to pursue the pre-ontological 
relationships between modern philosophical conceptions of speech and language. For 
example, he asks what it is about man that forms the footing for this conception of 
language. In his pursuit of language he does not seek to elucidate the system of sounds 
and words, but rather the ways in which they communicate and allow meaning to 
manifest in an articulated form. Speech plays a role in both utilitarian identification and 
extra-verbal communication.  
 Logos, as a way of dealing with language, is the result of the phenomenological 
approach and the idea of disclosedness Heidegger puts forth in Being and Time. Together 
with mood and understanding, Logos constitutes disclosedness from the moment of 
understanding to the moment of assertion.
6
 This allows things that are understood by the 
speaker to become articulated to his audience. As Jan Aler writes in his article, 
Heidegger’s Conception of Language in Being and Time, “Language came to the fore as 
an accidental moment in the structure of assertion—namely, “speaking forth” 
(Heraussage), “statement” (Aussagesatz). Logos, however, is a constituent of assertion as 
pre-lingual but articulated explanation.”
7
 Both Logos and language are integral to the 
ontological structure of assertion, though language is what we recognize to be essential in 
the average-everydayness of social experiences.  
 In Being and Time, Heidegger writes that the structure of Dasein must be freed. 
Dasein as Logos is equiprimordial with understanding, and language is the expression of 
this Logos. He writes, “The fact that language now becomes our theme for the first time 
will indicate that this phenomenon has its roots in the existential constitution of Dasein’s 
disclosedness. The existential ontological foundation of language is discourse or talk.”
8
 It 
seems that this means anything with the potential to be intelligible in primordial 
understanding has the potential to be articulated. Therefore, this is what initially allows 
Being-in-the-world to be articulated. If discourse always articulates intelligibility and 
understanding, the discourse that language expresses is existentially language. It is 
disclosedness that allows for this expression.   
                                                        
6
 Jan Aler “Heidegger’s Conception of Language in Being and Time,” in On Heidegger and 
Language, ed. Joseph J. Kockelmans. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972), 49.  
7
 Aler, Heidegger’s Conception of Language in Being and Time, 50.  




 Disclosedness is a making-manifest in which language takes part by constituting 
(1) the about which (2) announcement (3) communication (4) manifestation in a 
utilitarian system which contrasts with Heidegger’s later, more poetic style.
9
 
Disclosedness also leads to truth, and hearing and keeping silent specifically enable 
discourse’s function in the existentiality of existence to become “entirely plain”. 
10
 
Through this hearing and keeping silent, language leads to a realization of the truth of 
existence. Heidegger is now able to accomplish his ontological goals with this idea that 
language as disclosedness allows for thrownness and appropriation of an entity’s Being. 
In this thrownness, man is both actively and passively involved in meaning-giving by 
way of his language. Language is not merely an animation of words made possible by the 
mechanical processes of the vocal cords; it is a passive participation in recognition of the 
intrinsic value of external objects.  
 Heidegger’s attempts to re-purpose original concepts with Leitworte illustrate this 
emphasis on intrinsic value. This return to the ontological, mythic origins of language 
illustrates being in such a way that it at once recalls the origins of words and frees them 
from these origins. Heidegger writes of this simultaneous uncovering and preserving,  
“The ultimate business of philosophy is to preserve the force of the most 
elemental words in which Dasein expresses itself, and to keep the common 
understanding from leveling them off to that unintelligibility which 
functions in turn as a source of pseudo-problems.” 
11
 
To rely on Kantian terms, this unintelligibility is caused by the pervasion of phenomena 
and the forgetfulness of things in their nous. Words are more important in their capacity 
to convey man’s ontological condition than to determine instrumental values. Therefore, 
the foundation for man’s ontological dwelling that Heidegger seeks to create will be built 
on language as a communicator of something beyond what is immediate to our 
experience. This allows man’s ek-sistence to be characterized by his capability to give 
meaning to the realm of equipment in which he dwells. 
                                                        
9
 Joseph Kockelmans, “Preface,” in On Heidegger and Language (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1972),  xi. 
10
 Heidegger, Being and Time, 204. 
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 The activity of logos is what allows man to actively disclose existence, though 
logos itself is primordial and therefore unarticulated. As Jan Aler illustrates, the structure 
of logos is “aprioric” but not unable to be illustrated in a conversation composed of four 
moments: “ (1) I say (2) something (3) to someone (4) concerning certain events that 
happened.” 
12
 All four moments are required for understanding to occur. As we have 
seen, understanding requires hearing beyond the “acoustic phenomenon” of speech and 
an attention to intrinsic meanings. This insight is what allows the speaker to hold the 
listener’s attention. By this, the words and the rules that govern them fade to the 
background in the moment of speaking and hearing, thus allowing moods to be disclosed. 
Only in fallen, inauthentic speech, such as small talk, do words dominate the listener’s 
consciousness. Man as Being-in-the-world is in a state of thrownness that allows him to 
express logos existentially through language though the two are not the same. The 
presence of logos within the apriori structure of consciousness allows for this transition.  
  In Being and Time, Heidegger gives the reader a sense that his definition of truth 
falls away from the traditional understanding of truth as a sort of correctness between 
assertions and the way things are. However, he does not reject it entirely—he allows that 
the phenomenon of correctness is merely one aspect of truth. Truth as correctness is 
merely concerned with the real. Heidegger goes beyond that to uncover ontological truth, 
an apriori uncovering that allows truth to exist in the realm of the real. This uncovering is 
an act of poiesis, a concept Heidegger will take up in his later essays along with a focused 
inquiry into the nature of great poetry.  
 
 
1.1 | Revealing Truth 
 
In his 1950 essay, The Origin of the Work of Art, Heidegger sought to determine 
the artist’s role in the work of art and explains that the two are implicated in a cyclical 
relationship that ultimately gives way to truth. Just as the work of art could not exist 
without the artist, the artist derives his title from the work of art. In order to explicate this 
interrelation, Heidegger turns to an examination of the essence of art itself, which is not 
                                                        
12




the same as the work of art.  He observes the task of art and shows that there is a circular, 
self-referential relation between art, work of art, and artist. He shows that realization 
through this circular pattern is an archetype of human understanding, and he will later 
utilize it to illustrate language’s role in the saying of being. Man’s ability to create allows 
him to confirm his notion of his authentic self through that which he creates. For 
Heidegger, we must resist the temptation to dismiss this cycle by declaring that it violates 
logic. Rather, it must be closely followed in order to determine the origins, goals, and 
revelatory potential of great art.  
Our starting point will be the work of art. As the work of art is a piece of art as a 
whole, its nature must reveal something about the nature of art as a whole. Initially, 
Heidegger presents the work of art as a mere thing but suggests that it is comprised of 
something further and more essential. He writes, “This something else in the work 
constitutes its artistic nature…The work makes public something other than itself; …it is 
an allegory…a symbol.”
13
 It seems that the symbolic nature of the work of art cannot be 
made manifest and remain independent from the thingly element. By this, Heidegger 
establishes that we must define the nature of the thing and its potential to convey truth in 
order to determine the extent to which the symbolic depends on it. For Heidegger, truth is 
equivalent with capacity to communicate Being. 
If a thing is to communicate Being, it must not be defined too generally. 
Heidegger therefore picks a specific pair of shoes in a work by Van Gogh to illustrate that 
a thing can transcend its status as equipment in the work of art. Though they are the shoes 
of a peasant woman who certainly put them to hard use in a muddy field, they are 
depicted together without their wearer or even any clinging clods of dirt.
14
 For 
                                                        
13
 Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought. (New York: HarperCollins, 1971), 19. 
14 Note: The exact painting to which Heidegger refers in The Origin of the Work of Art is a matter 
of controversy among Heidegger scholars. While he may be referring to Van Gogh’s 1886 painting “A pair 
of shoes”, some believe that he melded aspects from a few different of Van Gogh’s paintings, and others 
believe that the shoes to which he refers actually belonged to Van Gogh, himself. So, if the shoes did not 
belong to a farmer-woman at all, then does Heidegger’s theory fail before it gets off of the ground? If he is 
wrong about the ontic properties of the painting, how can he possibly make any claims about its ontological 
properties? It seems to me that this ambiguity proves that what is at stake is not the ontic nature of the art, 
but rather the authenticity of our experience with the art. I do not mean to dismiss the attacks on the 
strength of Heidegger’s phenomenological bridge between shoes and earth/world tension, but I do not think 




Heidegger, this does not mean the painting fails to capture the more complicated story 
behind the shoes. He writes,  
“In the shoes vibrates the silent call of the earth…This equipment is 
pervaded by uncomplaining anxiety as to the certainty of bread, the 
wordless joy of having once more withstood want…This equipment 
belongs to the earth, and it is protected in the world of the peasant 




 To the woman who owns the shoes, they are merely equipment. However, the viewer of 
the work of art is able to behold the shoes as they participate, in their passive reliability, 
in the perpetuation of the woman’s existence. The painting’s ability to render the 
essential truth of the woman’s existence for the viewer is its work. The painting discloses 
the nature of being for the woman in a way that recalls, for Heidegger, the ancient Greek 




 At this point, Heidegger takes stock of what he has accomplished. It now seems 
that the nature of art is a working to uncover the truth of beings. It is apparent that he 
does not think of truth in the western sense of correctness or justice. Art establishes truth 
in the sense of emergence as it takes place through the work of art. Heidegger has now 
brought art beyond the realm of the thing—beyond the realm of simple physical re-
presentation. Now the question remains, how the artist can identify this essence in the 
subject so that he can uncover it. 
 To begin to answer this question, Heidegger points out that we must not seek to 
grasp the nature of a thing in order to determine its thingly substructure. The thingly 
substructure is not the “most immediate reality” of the work of art, though we had 
previously treated it in that way.
17
 It may have appeared to be the most immediate aspect 
of the work of art, but it is not where the truth is located. Now it seems that the reality of 
the work will lead us to the meaning of art. He writes, “To gain access to the work, it 
would be necessary to remove it from all relations to something other than itself, in order 
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 Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, 33. 
16
 Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, 35. 
17




to let it stand on its own for itself alone.”
18
 This is where the artist plays his role and then 
immediately bows out. He releases the art to stand on its own; he is a martyr of the 
creative process that bears great art. So, where does the work belong after it no longer 
belongs to him? 
 The work of art is “set up”—dedicated to the world it opens. The work of art 
comes to be out of its materials and creates an Open in which a world is constituted. In 
Heidegger’s words, “The work moves the earth itself into the Open of a world and keeps 
it there. The work lets the earth be an earth.”
19
 This earth is not a physical object, but an 
undisclosable entity that is only to be opened up when it remains tightly closed. To let the 
earth be an earth is to bring it forth in its self-secluding. Here, Heidegger cites an 
example that he spends later essays elaborating on, “To be sure, the poet also uses the 
word—not, however, like ordinary speakers and writers who have to use them up, but 
rather in such a way that the word only now becomes and remains truly a word.”
20
 This 
act of bringing forth is the unity created by the work, and this unity is what allows the 
world to work as a world. Heidegger identifies this creation of a world in the instance of 
Van Gogh’s painting of the pair of shoes. It seems that a work of art creates a world and 
also brings forth the truth of that world—the work of art cannot bring forth truth without 
a world in which it can be received.  
 Now that we have established that the work of art requires a world to uncover 
concealed truths, we can return to the question of the origin of these truths. We turn our 
attention to the fact that the work of art has been created, and this element of creation is 
the focal point of the work, regardless of the artist’s role.  For Heidegger, this “factum 
est” is what surpasses the artist to consistently be thrust forth from the work.
21
 Both the 
artist, as creator, and the human who responds to the art and therefore maintains it are 
necessary to preserve its truth. This preservation of truth is the essence of art. As he 
writes, “Thus art is: the creative preserving of truth in the work. Art then is the becoming 
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and happening of truth.”
22




 At this point in the essay, Heidegger shifts his attention to poetry and begins to 
advance the ideas he will develop further in his later essays. He writes, “All art, as the 
letting happen of the advent of the truth of what is, is, as such, essentially poetry.”
24
 
Poetry goes beyond the realm of the unreal to illuminate the Open through a linguistic 
venturing. For Heidegger, this is apparent if considered in light of the “right concept of 
language”. Language must not be thought of as a mere means for communication and 
signification. Rather, it must be thought of as a means to bring things into the Open, as 
that is what is most essential to its speaking. Without language, beings could not be 
brought to appearance by naming. This projection of names constitutes the thrownness of 
things into world and earth where poetry can speak their unconcealedness. 
Unconcealedness allows a people’s world historical character to be brought into the 
world. He writes  
“Actual language at any given moment is the happening of this saying, in 
which a people’s world historically arises for it and the earth is preserved 
as that which remains closed… In such saying, the concepts of an 
historical people’s nature, i.e., of its belonging to world history, are 
formed for that folk, before it.” 
By this, Heidegger differentiates the language of poetry from everyday language while 
maintaining that the essential nature of language is poetry. As poesy, the most original 
form of essential poetry, language constructs a place for poetry’s ability to comprise art 
and found truth. This founding of truth through bestowing, grounding, and beginning is 
what allows for the preservation of art that is essential to its ability to communicate.  
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2 | Dwelling in the Abyss 
 
After Being and Time, Heidegger’s turned his thought toward the 
phenomenological truth allowed by the language of poetry. Heidegger’s writings on 
poetry are meant to serve as a critique of modern subjectivity and a guide to help man can 
recover his wonder at things at once both self-withdrawing and revealed. In this section, I 
hope to explain why Heidegger rejects the limitations of subjectivity in favor of being in 
the sense of Gelassenheit, or releasement toward things.  
 In his collection of essays, Poetry, Language, Thought, Heidegger seeks to 
discover the true nature of language and its role in articulating Being by conducting a 
linguistic exploration of man’s consciousness. He does not take an anthropological, 
religious, or logical approach, but rather succeeds in his essays by following a poetic 
path. He begins by pitting man against an abyss in a dark era and challenges the poets to 
find a way to best experience this lack of ground through linguistic venturing. Although 
he spends the majority of his first essay characterizing the unshielded nature of man’s 
being, Heidegger goes on to examine how this unshieldedness is chiefly what 
characterizes man’s unique capacity for language in his last two essays. His analysis of 
poetry throughout his essays allows him to study language by entering into language’s 
speaking of itself, rather than focusing only on man’s speaking of language, which he 
believes to abysmal. Ultimately, Heidegger seeks to prove that language holds meaning 
within itself rather than drawing it from a correspondence model of reference foreign to 
the subject; within poetry exists the potential to uncover truth as it exists in the world. 
However, this is not to say that language should be utilized as a tool for characterizing 
the instrumental value of objects. He builds on his writings in Being and Time to suggest 
that poetry, as Sprachkunst, is uniquely capable of giving man a foundation built on 
uncovering intrinsic value in his unfounded world.
25
  
 Heidegger begins his quest in the essay What Are Poets For?, in which he sets out 
to answer the question of what poets must do in a destitute time. He begins by 
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characterizing the era to which we belong as a dark, destitute one. He writes, “…the 
evening of the world’s age has been declining toward its night. The era is defined by the 
god’s failure to arrive, or the “default of God”.”
26
 Heidegger goes even further to 
radicalize this concept by holding that man is forgetful of the default of God. He writes 
that the current era is a destitute time devoid of reason, as man has lost the sense that 
objects have value beyond their instrumental worth. It seems that God is the ultimate 
giver of value and the reason for intrinsic value of objects, but man has become forgetful 
of this in the recent cultural shift toward the destitute era. In this destitute, value-centric 
Age of Technology, man commits the great sin of ascribing human values to things of 
heaven and earth, which, for Heidegger, is a sign of the forgetfulness of the default of 
God.
27
   
In this forgetful state, man believes that objects have value only insofar as they 
serve some human end. If man believes nothing is instrumentally viable on its own apart 
from human aims, man must have forgotten that there is a god who gives intrinsic value 
to things regardless of man’s awareness. This utilitarian emphasis has led humanity into 
an abyss.  He challenges mortals to reach into this abyss and “come into ownership of 
their own nature” rather than trying to escape.
28
 He seeks to communicate Being in a way 
that transcends this compulsion toward valuation. For Heidegger, man can achieve this 
through poetry.  
 In this abysmal, post-philosophical era, Heidegger’s theory of poetic language 
explains how man can think non-representationally and avoid the violence technology 
does to its objects by giving them a value. By avoiding subjectivity, man can avoid 
violence. He can let things be in their object-ness by letting go of his need to reify and 
dominate them. This requires him to relinquish his subjectivity to preserve a 
philosophical, phenomenological outlook. Poetic language has the potential to free man 
from his instrumental use of language and allow him to dwell poetically and be liberated 
from technology. Heidegger holds that poetry can bridge the gap between the realm of 
technology, in which truth and being are covered up, and the realm of thinking.  
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 Heidegger holds that the poet is best equipped to delve into the abyss because he 
“entrenches himself in purposeful self-assertion, and by means of absolute objectification 
installs himself in the parting against the Open, then he himself promotes his own 
unshieldedness.”
29
 It is the poet’s obligation to “retrieve truth from the void of 
forgetfulness” and bring it to light by seeing things in themselves.
30
 The subject/object 
construct of man’s consciousness necessitates this ‘unshieldedness’ in order for him to 
objectify things outside of himself and experience the safety created by this venturing. 
This venturing is a synonym for the Dasein. Dasein identifies the dwelling or ek-sistence 
of a being within the historical frame of the infinite horizon of consciousness that 
encompasses the Open. Heidegger goes on to say that this historical frame is brought 
about by language. He writes, “Language is the precinct…the house of being…It is 
because language is the house of Being, that we reach what is by constantly going 
through this house.”
31
 Additionally, his essay Das Seiende reads, “Language is the 
primordial poetry through which a people speaks being.”
32
 For Heidegger, the concept of 
Being is inextricably linked to poetic language.  
Heidegger suggests that man’s representational consciousness is structured so that 
it takes the objects it identifies and ‘consumes’ them in their objective unshieldedness 
before moving on to new objects.
33
 He writes, “What is presumed to be eternal merely 
conceals a suspended transiency, suspended in the void of a durationless now.”
34
 This 
seems to mean that only language is capable of prevailing in terms of describing 
existence, because it is inexhaustible and has the ability to reach things in their thingness. 
If language is the thing more daring than Being, the poet is capable of daring the abyss by 
entering into its speaking. It seems that he believes that although man cannot venture or 
will himself into the abyss, he can dare it with language. However, this daring is not a 
way for man to escape his un-grounded state.  The question of this essay is not how to 
use technology or language to free man from the destitute time, but rather how language 
must be thought of as a medium to experience it most effectively. While man uses 
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technology to control, dominate, and exploit nature as a result of his subjective 
consciousness, he can use poetry as an outlet for his willing because poetry is a limitless 
resource for him. For Heidegger, this explains why poets wield such power when it 
comes to uncovering the truth of Being through language.  
 Heidegger begins his essay, “Language”, by reiterating the notion that man’s 
natural capability of speaking sets him apart from other organisms. He writes, “Man 
speaks… We speak because speaking is natural to us… It is held that man, in distinction 
from plant and animal is the living being capable of speech.”
35
 These statements seem to 
be obvious. However, the reader soon discovers that Heidegger is more preoccupied with 
language’s power to define and uncover “essences”. He begins with what appears to be 
an empty tautology, “Language is language”, and goes on to show that this phrase will 
not leave us falling into the absurd, infinite regress of man’s dependence on actual words. 
Heidegger explains this when he reminds the reader, “To reflect on language thus 
demands that we enter into the speaking of language in order to take up our stay with 
language, i.e., within it’s speaking, not within our own.”
36
 This seems to mean that 
language is misused when employed as a mere tool to designate values within the realm 
of rules constructed by society. Entering, as the great poets do, into the speaking of 
language represents a withdrawal from the territory of valuation and the acceptance of a 
certain passivity with regard to expression.  
Heidegger seeks to discover the truth of objects by uncovering them as they are. 
The original Greek term aletheia, or uncovering, characterizes Heidegger’s mission as a 
“truth-seeker” as it implies that truth derives from an uncovering of what already is. For 
Heidegger, it is important that man “must see [things] as they are in themselves and not 
merely as they are for him.”
37
 This draws a distinction between reality as utility and 
reality as independent existence. For Heidegger, man has the potential to access things in 
themselves. He does not subscribe to the Kantian notion that it is impossible to know 
things in their nous. He believes that the poets are best equipped to do this because they 
have the gift of language, which enables them to experience the Open and communicate 
whatever objective truths they uncover without imposing an instrumental value. In great 
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poems, poets present a combination of poetry and thought: “The voice of thought must be 




 Heidegger draws upon the poetry of Hölderlin to affirm his belief that poetry is 
the only way to elucidate Being. Hölderlin writes, “Man dwells poetically on this earth”, 
and Heidegger believes that poets are messengers who make man aware of this dwelling 
by allowing him to conceptualize the divine through objective truth. He holds that poets 
are just as important to understanding Being as thinkers are because they place ordinary 
objects in their context within the scheme of Being and relate objects to a higher level. In 
other words, “to dwell poetically on earth is to find in the simple and homely things of 
every-day experience the divine and the holy.”
39
 Whereas philosophers contemplate and 
interpret being, poets rediscover its very nature.  
 For Heidegger, the poets succeed because they avoid subjectivism. I have already 
mentioned that Heidegger’s main complaint about the Age of Technology involves the 
notion that it is an age in which everything is manipulated and given a value. The 
historical frame of this destitute era is characterized by man’s vision of himself in relation 
to objects as things that can benefit him. If something exists, it has value. Heidegger 
argues that this contributes to man’s homeless, unsheltered state, and he seeks to remedy 
this by curing man’s forgetfulness of the source of his being and returning him from the 
Abgrund, or abyss. For Heidegger, man’s primary duty is to listen, and man’s 
problematic approach to language in the Age of Technology is an active one in its 
subjectivity—he forgets to listen. Heidegger’s concept of the Abgrund is uniquely well 
suited to illustrate anti-utilitarian perspective in that man cannot exploit his surroundings 
if he is in a groundless state.    
But what about Heidegger’s concept of language as the House of Being? It seems 
that a deeper understanding of this assertion will reveal the structure behind man’s ability 
to dwell poetically, which Heidegger will discuss later. In his essay, “Language”, 
Heidegger further investigates the questions that arise from his assertion: “Language 
speaks.” He defines what it is to speak and how man must best learn to make use of 
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speech. Heidegger reveals that he is not trying to create a new way of looking at 
language. Rather, he is emphasizing the importance of “learning to live in the speaking of 
language”, just like he was seeking how to best experience the Abgrund in previous 
essays.
40
 Speech in this sense refers to listening in tandem with passive articulation rather 
than the communication of cultural constructs. He analyzes Georg Trakl’s poem, “A 
Winter Evening”, and reveals how he believes the language of the three-stanza poem to 
be a metaphor for the nature of language. By recalling the central issue of the dif-ference 
from Being and Time, Heidegger reveals that he believes language to be joined together 
with man’s nature without being overlapped with it or enmeshed in it. This will lead to an 
explanation of what it is to dwell poetically.  
Heidegger begins the second half of the essay by reestablishing the central 
issue of the “speaking”. He says that language speaks, not man. He identifies that to 
speak is to name, to name is to call, to call is to bid, or invite things and world into our 
consciousness. This means that language, in the form of speech, calls things into our 
consciousness. He writes that this takes place by nature of the dif-ference, or the division 
that prevails between world and thing that characterizes the middle of their penetration of 
each other. It seems that world and language are interchangeable as Heidegger writes, 
“World grants things…they penetrate each other”.
41
 To further characterize this ‘middle’ 
he writes, “The dif-ference for world and thing disclosingly appropriates things into 
bearing a world; it disclosingly appropriates world into the granting of things.”
42
 
The dif-ference is the bidder, and Heidegger tracks the bidding of language 
throughout Trakl’s poem. He follows each of the stanzas as he believes they bid, 
respectively, things, world, and the intimacy between them.  
 
   A WINTER EVENING 
Window with falling snow is arrayed, 
Long tolls the vesper bell, 
The house is provided well, 
The table is for many laid. 
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Wandering ones, more than a few, 
Come to the door on darksome courses. 
Golden blooms the tree of graces 
Drawing up the earth’s cool dew.  
 
Wander quietly steps within; 
Pain has turned the threshold to stone. 
There lie, in limpid brightness shown, 




For Heidegger, language speaks in this poem. The intimacy in the third stanza 
that brings thing and world together is produced by the introduction of Trakl’s concept of 
Pain. Heidegger writes, “Pain joins the rift of the dif-ference. Pain is the dif-ference 
itself.”
44
 He goes on to interpret that pain is not a human sensation, but the seam that 
binds together world and things. As the dif-ference, pain is the “luminous joining” that 
“expropriates the world into its worlding, which grants things.” This penetration of thing 
and world is a central issue in this essay, but Heidegger does not seem to be implying that 
it has any cultural significance. Trakl’s poem is most relevant to Heidegger because it 
articulates the four-fold nature of the world thus encouraging man to experience the 
world in itself. The concept of the four-fold seems to be one of Heidegger’s most 
complicated, and I find it to be best elucidated by Herbert Spiegelberg in his paper Das 
Ding,  
“Earth and sky, divinities and mortals—being at one with one another 
of their own accord—belong together by way of the simpleness of the 
united fourfold. Each of the four mirrors in its own way the presence of 
the others. Each therewith reflects itself in its own way into its own, 
within the simpleness of the four…The appropriate mirroring sets each 
of the four free into its own, but it binds these free ones into the 
simplicity of their essential being toward one another.”
45
 
It seems that man is capable of experiencing the four-fold without being limited by his 
subjectivity because it is characterized by “essential being”. In “…Poetically man 
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Dwells…”, Heidegger will note that man’s dwelling is dependent on the fourfold, as 
“Man’s dwelling depends on an upward-looking measure-taking of the dimension, in 
which the sky belongs just as much as the earth.”
46 This seems to reflect a different, pre-
evaluative cultural attitude that is capable of measuring without seeking to dominate. He 
will add that poetry is the only medium still capable of this measuring.  
Heidegger returns to the concept of the dif-ference to characterize its ability to 
“still things in thinging and the world in worlding” and gather them into the rift as the 
peal of stillness.
47
 This leads Heidegger to conclude, “Language speaks as the peal of 
stillness… language goes on as the taking place or occurring of the dif-ference for world 
and things”.
48
 Although he says that the peal of stillness is not human, speech is indeed 
human nature and human beings are brought into their own by language. He explains this, 
“language needs and uses the speaking of mortals in order to sound as the peal of stillness 
for the hearing of mortals.”
49
 
Heidegger goes on to reiterate that mortal speech is designating names and 
thereby bidding thing and world to come. He identifies that mortals call the dif-ference 
by responding, and that they “heed the bidding call of the stillness of the dif-ference” by 
nature.
50
 It seems that mortals exist in language by listening in the peal of stillness and 
responding. This recalls Heidegger’s approach to the abyss in the previous chapter, as he 
identified that it was more important to learn how to experience the abyss than to learn 
how to defy it. He identifies the root behind man’s ability to dwell poetically when he 
notes, “What is important is learning to live in the speaking of language.”
51
 
Heidegger proves in this essay that it is foolish of the reader to take his assertion, 
“Language is language”, as a simple tautology. He uses the essay to lay out a logical plan 
that links man’s nature with language in a way that draws them into one another without 
overlapping them.  
However, Heidegger does not conclusively prove that man’s subjective conscious 
is capable of becoming wholly fused with things. Although he has just conducted a close 
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reading of Georg Trakl’s “A Winter Evening”, a closer look at his analysis reveals that he 
has not really provided any definitive interpretation of the text. Man is set apart from 
things (in the gathering sense) because he can only experience objects through the 
Vorstellung of his own consciousness. Therefore, how can he definitively interpret 
anything? Heidegger writes in his “Letter on Humanism”, “Being is the nearest thing. But 
this nearness remains furthest away from man… To experience and to say this—this is 
what the thinking of the future will have to learn.”
52
 Heidegger holds that to reflect on the 
nature of language is to use speaking as an abode for this nearest being of mortals.
53
 In 
“Language”, he redefines what it means to truly speak in order to establish a foundation 
for his discussion of man’s consciousness. In the linguistic struggle between instrumental 
and intrinsic values, man is conditioned to default towards dominance because he is an 
agent of valuation and wholly enmeshed in technology. In order to return to what is 
essential in speech, that is, uncovering of intrinsic value, man must be attuned to the call 
of the dif-ference.  
 Heidegger writes that there are three generally accepted assertions regarding 
speech. First, it is held that speech allows expression in that, “If we take language to be 
utterance, we give an eternal, surface notion of it at the very moment when we explain it 
by recourse to something eternal.”
54
 This seems to explain language at its most intuitive, 
cultural form. Expression is what allows the communication of thoughts and ideas and 
encompasses language as a basic neuronal process. However, Heidegger warns that 
language can become nothing more than printed word when used merely for reference. 
He writes language as reference alone, “will never help us to escape from the inversion of 
the true relation of dominance between language and man.”
55
 Though he is essentially a 
speaking being whose linguistic capabilities came before his first utterances, man 
continues to wrongly ignore the provenance of his ability to signify in his daily 
discourses. This ignorance of his own essence has caused him to be further alienated 
from the intrinsic value of objects—things in themselves. The inverted relation caused by 
this ignorance leads man to believe that he is the master of language.  
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For Heidegger, speech is an activity of man in that it is the activity that allows for 
his existence, or, “It is language that first brings man about, brings him into existence.”
56
 
Finally, he characterizes speech in the greater context of human expression as “a 
presentation and representation of the real and the unreal.”
57
 This is the characterization 
that allows speech to create a historical framework for being. Language always 
communicates what man’s representational consciousness comes up with, so it is always 
a representation and therefore secondary which seems to be pejorative. However, for 
Heidegger, this representation is precisely what gives man the potential to dwell free of 
the modern notion of subjectivity.  
Heidegger acknowledges that man is incapable of circumscribing the whole 
nature of language, but he uses these three definitions to gain a more comprehensive 
understanding of speech, although he questions their “correctness” because, “despite their 
antiquity and despite their comprehensibility, they never bring us to language as 
language.”
58
 Heidegger maintains that the most comprehensive way to experience 
language as language is to return to the tautological assertion that “Language speaks.” 
This realization leads him back to the notion that poetry is the “purest” medium when it 
comes to communicating the nature of things as they are. It is a symbolic way that is able 
to come very close to the purely semiotic in its method of signification. Man dwells 
within poetry, as he is always already at home there.  
 In “…Poetically Man Dwells…”, Heidegger reads into all the implications of 
Friedrich Hölderlin’s assertion and responds to the phrase itself. He begins to pick apart 
the phrase by questioning each component. First, he recalls his notion that man is made 
homeless by his “hunt for gain and success” spurred on by the emphasis on value in the 
Age of Technology, so he asks, how is there space for the poetic in the hectic nature of 
dwelling in this destitute era? Heidegger notes that this poetry mostly represents “at best 
a preoccupation with aestheticizing”, and it is easy to discount it as “frivolous 
mooning”.
59
 These assumptions are legitimized by the pervasive instrumentalism and 
alienation from language inherent in the technological age. Next, Heidegger points out 
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the problem that the phrase was penned by a poet in the first place which begs the 
question of whether or not poets are blind to actuality and merely bring things forth from 
their imagination. He recalls the notion of original Greek poiesis and notes that this word 
carries implications of bringing forth. However, it appears that Heidegger is speaking 
polemically as he backtracks and explains that complete dwelling and poetic bringing-
forth are indeed compatible.  
 Heidegger points out that the word ‘dwelling’ does not necessarily refer to the 
dwelling conditions in the current era. It can instead be thought of as a function of Being; 
it is one of many forms of human behavior. He writes, “Perhaps the two can bear with 
each other…Perhaps one even bears the other in such a way that dwelling rests on the 
poetic…we are required to think of dwelling and poetry in terms of their essential 
nature.”
60
 Therefore, Hölderlin must be referring to poetry and dwelling in their 
individual essences, rather than as the cultural constructs that man imagines them to be. 
Heidegger fleshes out this point by saying that dwellings are attained through building. 
Creation, or poiesis as putting forth, is a sort of building, and poetic creation allows us to 
obtain dwelling. He writes, “we are to think of the nature of poetry as a letting-dwell, as 
a—perhaps even the—distinctive kind of building.”
61
 By following this path of thought 
we are to arrive at the nature of dwelling, and Hölderlin is capable of this because “he 
poetizes the essence of poetry.”
62
 In this, he is able to see things in the house of being 
because he removes them from a technological frame and creates a new frame in which 
the uncovering of intrinsic values can take place.  
 However, Heidegger is not satisfied with this. He also goes on to ask how man 
can even claim to have reasoned the nature of something. He then comes full circle in his 
writings and adds that man knows such things only when he is the recipient of these 
claims. Man receives these claims from language. As we have seen before, man is wrong 
to act as though he controls language, for “in fact language remains the master of man. 
When this relation of dominance gets inverted, man hits upon strange maneuvers.”
63
 He 
emphasizes repeatedly that language does the speaking and man is only capable of 
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speaking when he listens and responds to the call. This explains the effectiveness of 
poetry as, “the responding in which man authentically listens to the appeal of language is 
that which speaks in the element of poetry.”
64
 Man listens more closely to the pure 
language of poetry. Poetic language allows man to constantly build and produce. In order 
to build, foundations are necessary. Thus, through language, man creates for himself a 
grounding in the abyss. Once he has created a grounding, he no longer must rely on his 
utilitarian tendencies to be rooted in the world. For Heidegger, “man is capable of 
dwelling only if he has already built, is building, and remains disposed to build, in 
another way.”
65
 Building seems to be the key. He goes on, “Authentic building occurs so 
far as there are poets, such poets as take the measure for architecture, the structure of 
dwelling.”
66
 However, he makes sure to avoid turning this into a definitive statement by 
going on to bring up all the questions invited by this seemingly absolute assertion.  
 Heidegger concludes his essay by bringing up the question of poetry’s 
transcendence. He wonders what the measure for poetry may be and concludes that it 
seems to be God. So we must ask, what is God? Heidegger seeks to address this question 
by distinguishing which aspects of the fourfold are alien to the god and which are alien to 
man. It seems that the earthly aspects under the sky are intimate to man and therefore the 
poet is able to call them. The poet’s adeptness at calling enables him to also call the 
aspects of objects that conceal themselves. These aspects are familiar to the god. As 
Heidegger explains, “The poetic saying of images gathers the brightness and sound of the 
heavenly appearances into one with the darkness and silence of what is alien.”
67
 
However, it is man’s unique structure of consciousness that allows him to connect to 
poetic language.  
 As we saw in Being and Time, Man’s structure of consciousness, when viewed in 
the form of subject/object, means that he can only learn through negation. Therefore, 
Heidegger assures the reader that man truly does have knowledge of the poetic. He 
writes, “That we dwell unpoetically, and in what way, we can in any case learn only if we 
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  Man only knows things in terms of other things he knows and things 
he does not know. As Heidegger noted in “What Are Poets For?”, “A comparison places 
different things in an identical setting to make the difference visible.”
69
 This setting is 
man’s subjective consciousness. Thus, man dwells poetically on earth because poetic 
language dares the limits of language as it expresses consciousness by revealing 
concealed elements of objects.  
 Ultimately, for Heidegger, it is man’s capacity for responding that enables him to 
use language, specifically poetic language, to create a grounding for himself in the 
Abgrund. By Being in the abyss, beings are forced to venture and dare language in order 
to exist in the destitute time. Heidegger holds that poets are best equipped to 
communicate that which is concealed through language, as they are able to reveal things 
that do not fit into the structure of our consciousness and bring the Open toward man as 
an object. He writes, “Man places before himself the world as the whole of everything 
objective, and he places himself before the world. Man sets up the world toward himself, 
and delivers Nature over to himself.”
70
 Ultimately, this frame of consciousness both 
characterizes by building and is characterized by an uncovering of the historical frame 
present in the Age of Technology when beyond the focus on value and production. As 
Heidegger reminds the reader, “the essence of life is supposed to yield itself to technical 
production.”
71
 Heidegger’s Poetry, Language, Thought seems to be in essence a 
confrontation of the abyss of a dark era through poetic language with the realization that 
poetic language alone allows man to dwell in the abyss. Indeed, Heidegger employs his 
own theories as he uses poetic examples throughout his essays to support his assertions. 
He ultimately succeeds in laying a foundation for the notion that language holds meaning 
within itself rather than drawing it from a foreign correspondence model of reference. 
Man needs the guidance of the poets to realize transcendent images as they are concealed 
to his consciousness and to provide him with a grounding in the midst of a godless abyss.  
 All facets considered, Heidegger’s idea of poetic language is consistent with his 
phenomenological project. As we saw in Being and Time, language is a dimension of ek-
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sistence because of its meaning-giving and uncovering properties. Because of the 
phenomenological preoccupation with the flawed perspective of man’s consciousness, 
our potential to gain a successful view of language is dependent on whether or not our 
concept of man’s Being is successful.
72
 If the success of language depends on whether or 
not listening and speaking are capable of asserting an always already constituted structure 
of saying, then poetry is the best way to communicate the world. It calls world and things 
together in such a way that they create an openness in which Being manifests itself. As 
Heidegger writes, “Poetry is what first brings man onto the earth, making him belong to 
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3 | Criticisms 
 
 Martin Heidegger incited a large and growing debate with his writings. The 
problem of the relation between his philosophy and his National Socialist politics has 
divided his followers: his political involvements become either contingent or essential to 
an analysis of his philosophical work. Theodor Adorno and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe are 
two thinkers from different eras who shared the latter perspective. In this chapter, I will 
explicate Adorno’s formal criticisms and Lacoue-Labarthe’s political criticisms as they 
problematize the implications of Heidegger’s reliance on poetry.   
 
3.1 | Adorno & Formal Implications 
 
Theodor Adorno established himself as a leading German intellectual around 
1949 with his return to Frankfurt after a Nazi-imposed exile in England and the United 
States. As one of Heidegger’s most prominent critics, Adorno is also famously a critic of 
positivist thought and instrumental reason. Positivism is a philosophical system within 
which every rationally justifiable assertion can be scientifically verified or is capable of 
logical or mathematical proof, and that therefore could be reasonably expected to reject 
the metaphysics that Heidegger’s writings were born out of.  However, Adorno does not 
deny in his writings that language contains a moment of transcendence. Adorno finds 
grounds to reject both Heidegger’s fundamental ontology and the language with which he 




Adorno notices Heidegger’s allowance of the antagonism that characterizes the 
relationship between the totality of communication and the violence it does to the 
particular. It seems that the essential violence that characterizes language is such that in 
order for things to be elevated to the conceptual their particularity will come into 
question. Adorno will point out the effects of this elevation and what it says about 
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individuality. He is troubled by the circle between language as a medium for universality 
and a tool used to render things in their particularity. As David Sherman writes,  
“Heidegger’s philosophical stand against reflection does not result in a 
dialectical separation always straining toward a fleeting identity between 
expression and thing. Instead language tends to lose the things to which it 
purportedly refers, for it no longer flows from its subject matter but rather 
“seems to fly above its correlative, thereby establish[ing] itself as 
something higher”. (JOA p. 87)
75
  
His critique of Heidegger’s conceptual language leads him to suggest a different form to 
provide a coherent totality.   
In his literary criticisms, Theodor Adorno examines the nature of the relationship 
between philosophy and literature from a methodological standpoint. He presents his 
critiques in a complex, dialectical style of writing that communicates the presupposition 
that whatever one writes about is characterized by irresolvable conflicts that cannot be 
translated into a logic of non-contradiction. In his writings, Adorno does not try and 
overcome contradiction; rather, he is conscious that social reality is characterized by 
conflict, and his dialectical style reflects this consciousness. For Adorno, it would be 
mere ideology to assume that a text or work of art can render any social reality in a non-
contradictory manner. He holds that the truth content of any art form is located in this 
contradiction, and the first task for anyone who approaches any subject matter must be to 
attend to the pre-inscribed contradictions in that subject matter. Though he does not deny 
that language possesses an element of transcendence, Adorno identifies the contradictions 
in Heidegger’s fundamental ontology and theory of language, which he problematizes in 
his essay, Parataxis and his work The Jargon of Authenticity (1973). He also suggests 
that the answer for the dialectical, contradictory nature of society can only be found at the 
level of form.  He furthers this notion in his piece, The Essay as Form. Ultimately, 
Adorno is focused on the effects that language and philosophy have on the nature of 
individuality. 
In Parataxis, Adorno examines Heidegger’s analysis of the poetry of Hölderlin by 
using the philological approach as a point of departure. This approach is based on the 
                                                        




belief that it allows a more in depth reconstruction of intentions than the philosophical 
approach would, as it objectifies subjective intention, which can be viewed as the locus of 
the truth. A philological approach allows preconstruction of intentions, and subjective 
intention becomes objectified. Intentionality is articulated through the poem therefore the 
intention is part of rather than basis for and must be interpreted as such.  In order for the 
philological approach to be successful, structural unity is presupposed, and the work is 
the totality. Therefore, authorial intention becomes part of the poem, and this 
intentionality must be interpreted as a part of rather than a basis for the poetry. If what the 
author intended to say is the truth, then everything is located within the artist. Therefore, 
the process of writing could be deemed superfluous. This is problematic, as it excludes 
the necessity of language and means that truth must be trans-subjective. 
 Language is not merely subjective, as it could not communicate without 
presupposing commonality. For Adorno, it is a Philistine conception to hold that the 
author has control over the final product. As Adorno writes in Notes to Literature III, 
“The contradiction according to which every work wants to be understood purely on its 
own terms but none can in fact be so understood is what leads to the truth content.”
76
 
Truth content lies in the structure, and therefore Heidegger’s method of extracting 
Leitworte, or thematic words, reduces the work and ignores the notion that a work of art 
is the totality of its moments. This jargon, though Heidegger believes it to get closer to an 
ontological understanding, is what renders his analysis problematic for Adorno—it just 
covers up the destitute era rather than reaching into it. He writes that his problem with 
Heidegger’s thought is that “it transforms a bad empirical reality into transcendence.”
77
 
Heidegger transforms philosophy into literature in his reading of Hölderlin’s poetry. He 
levels the conceptual differences between the two, while Adorno is always noting the 
historical differences between them. 
In a way, it seems that Adorno agrees with Heidegger. Poets are capable of 
achieving truth, as their awareness of the unity of language constitutes a violence that is 
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capable of receiving nature when considered dialectically in terms of unity. That this 
unity does violence to language represents the dual character of language. As Adorno 
writes of Hölderlin, “His dialectical experience does not know language merely as 
something external and repressive; it also knows its truth.”
78
 However, he maintains the 
notion of subjective intention that Heidegger rejects: “Without externalizing itself in 




Adorno writes, “The poetry of the late Hölderlin becomes polarized into names 
and correspondences on the one hand and concepts on the other.”80 It seems that a work 
is not totally reducible to its structure, and thus Adorno refutes the philological approach 
he began with. This dialectical writing implies the paradoxical relationship between 
poetry and philosophy. For Adorno, Hölderlin’s poetry is attractive to phenomenologists 
and those who hope to elucidate the meaning of Being because of the “abstractions”, 
which “bear an inviting resemblance to the medium of philosophy.”
81
 However, 
Hölderlin does not get any closer to an explanation of Being with the abstractions in his 
poetry than Heidegger does with his Leitworte. In dealing with names, both Heidegger 
and Hölderlin fail to encapsulate the idea of Being and these names become mere shells 
of failed ideas.  
 The problem is that poetry cannot be interpreted as Aussage, or message, as what 
is true of philosophy cannot be formulated into a poetic message. If the philosopher fails 
to distinguish between them, as Adorno accuses Heidegger of doing, he effectively 
deaestheticize poetry and it becomes philosophy. Poetry cannot be any more effective at 
characterizing reality than philosophy is if it is neutralized in this way. As Adorno writes, 
“The truth content’s aesthetic medium is ignored; Hölderlin is skewered on the alleged 
Leitworte selected by Heidegger for authoritarian purposes.”
82
 It seems that, for Adorno, 
Heidegger has committed the very offense he sought to avoid in his essays—he has taken 
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a utilitarian approach to poetry and given it an instrumental value through his analysis of 
it.  
In order for the relationship between philosophy and poetry to be productive and 
positive, the two must come to each other without violence. Philosophy is capable of 
elucidating truth content within poetry, as poetry benefits from the conceptuality that 
philosophical considerations reveal. Like the relationship between language and Being, 
the relationship between philosophy and poetry cannot be understood in terms of 
mastery. Poetry is a mere vehicle for philosophy, and philosophy also serves as a vehicle 
for the poem as long as it remains indifferent to the poetry itself. For Heidegger, any 
commentary that philosophy provides must make itself superfluous. Adorno’s problem 
with Heidegger’s analysis of Hölderlin is rooted in the fact that Heidegger turns poetic 
lines into statements; therefore the two are dialectically elided in his work. This makes 
his discourse quasi-poetic, which is problematic for Adorno, as he holds that the 
difference between the two must be respected. By picking and choosing certain words, 
Heidegger is effectively detemporalizing the truth content of the poem and neutralizing 
its intrinsic value. Adorno writes, “Heidegger’s is false in that, as method, it detaches 
itself form the matter at hand and infiltrates the aspect of Hölderlin’s poetry that requires 
philosophy with philosophy from the outside…the assertion of an unarticulated unity of 
form and content is no longer adequate.”83 This unity can only occur if the poem is 
viewed as a totality.  
For Adorno, Heidegger’s treatment of the poet is a misguided glorification. His, 
“pseudo-poetry testifies against his philosophy of poetry”, and his “cheap heroizing of 
the poet” draws the focus away from the medium that is the locus of the truth content.
84
 
Setting Hölderlin apart with the metaphysical elevation a philosophical treatment allows 
for lacks “sensitivity to the collective strength that produces spiritual individualization in 
the first place... detemporaliz[ing] the truth content of philosophy and literary works.”
85
  
By giving poetry the philosophical treatment, Heidegger already ensures that the results 
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of his reading will bear witness to his method. It is apparent that Heidegger’s utilitarian 
attitude toward the deconstruction of poetry is challenging in light of his belief that such 
searching for instrumental value is what has caused society’s fallen status. 
Adorno holds that language only designates things, which must mean that 
language operates as a mere medium for universality. This is problematic because it 
leaves words incapable of rendering things in their particularity. He writes, “They are 
mere signs. They do not want to be that; it is a death sentence for them. This was the 
price Hölderlin had to pay. His poetry diverges decisively from philosophy, because the 
latter takes an affirmative stance toward the negation of existing entities.”86 In Parataxis, 
this is the essential violence that characterizes language. In order for things to be elevated 
to the conceptual level, they must die in their particularity. The only method of 
maintaining some level of particularity is through proper names. Proper names are 
supposed to render individuality, as they cannot be subsumed under generalization. 
Adorno writes of the desire to retain individuality, “it is produced by nostalgia for the 
missing name, as well as by nostalgia for a universality, in the good sense…”
87
 However, 
no object is capable of resisting the universal just as no language is capable of rendering 
the particularity of a thing in its essence. This means that of course Hölderlin’s poetry is 
incapable of reconciling the actual and conceptual or the finite and the infinite. 
Reconciliation is ultimately blocked, as language cannot be divorced from conceptuality. 
Adorno says of Hölderlin, “he pointed up the untruth in any reconciliation of the general 
and the particular within an ureconciled reality…”
88
 He reveals this dualistic nature of 
language through the paratactic language of his poetry.  
For Adorno, the only form that can operate without reducing concepts to objects 
is the essay. He writes, “The essay allows for the consciousness of nonidentity, without 
expressing it directly; it is radical in its non-radicalism, in refraining from any reduction 
to a principle, in its accentuation of the partial against the total, in its fragmentary 
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 The essay is the only medium capable of portraying the world as a totality, 
in that its contingency necessitates a whole. As a constellation of concepts, it is free from 
both philosophy and literature; it bridges the gap between the two. The essay is not an 
objective treatise, as it is merely subjective. As he writes in The Essay as Form, “Instead 
of achieving something scientifically, or creating something artistically, the effort of the 
essay reflects a childlike freedom that catches fire, without scruple, on what others have 
already done. The essay mirrors what is loved and hated instead of presenting the 
intellect, on the model of a boundless work ethic, as creatio ex nihilo.”
90
 In his writings, 
Adorno mobilizes the essay in a methodological manner, as he believes it is the only 
mode of presentation that adheres to the present social reality. Therefore, the essay is 
capable of holding out against the cheap reconciliation of ideology because it does not 
disavow antagonism. In this view, the essay is the form responsible for conveying the 
semiotic through conscious manipulation of the symbolic. 
 Adorno’s writings in Notes to Literature elucidate his theory that the dialectical 
relationship between philosophy and literature parallels the conflictual nature of social 
reality. His dialectical style of writing enables him to communicate his position that any 
attempt to render this reality in a non-contradictory manner is purely ideological and 
false. As he writes, “The ambitious transcendence of language beyond its meaning 
results in a meaninglessness that can easily be seized upon by a positivism to which one 
thinks oneself superior; and yet, one falls victim to positivism precisely through that 
meaninglessness that positivism criticizes and shares with it.”
91
 For Adorno, art partakes 
of these contradictions.  Like Heidegger’s problem of the abyss, Adorno’s issues with 
the culture of post-Holocaust horror are rooted in the notion that there are no new forms 
to communicate the new, degraded culture. Therefore, 20th century concepts are forced 
into 18
th
 century forms—they are incapable of communicating anything that comes after 
the horrors of the 20
th
 century.  It seems that, for Adorno, the best explanation for the 
dialectical relationship between culture and literature lies at the formal level. 
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3.2 | Lacoue-Labarthe & Political Implications 
 
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe focuses his criticisms of Martin Heidegger’s writing 
on content rather than form. He writes to reveal and condemn what he believes to be the 
fascist nature of Heidegger’s thought. He believes that the political motivations behind 
Heidegger’s writings overshadow his philosophy entirely. To back up this weighty 
claim, Lacoue-Labarthe assembled five of his lectures presented between 1987 and 1998 
that highlight the damning “aesthetic-politico” echoes in Heidegger’s work. In 
Heidegger and the Politics of Poetry, Lacoue-Labarthe examines the intellectual 
background of Heidegger’s treatment of poetry from Romanticism to German Idealism 
and explores the implications of the relationship between poetry, philosophy, and 
politics. He begins the prologue, entitled “Heidegger’s Onto-Mythology” by citing 
Heidegger’s declaration that “Knowing a primal history is not ferreting out the primitive 
and collecting bones. It is neither half nor whole natural science, but, if it is anything at 
all, it is mythology.”
92
 Lacoue-Labarthe lays the foundations here for his further 
investigation of Heidegger’s concept of the provenance of the possibility of a ‘historical 
Being’ by introducing the fundamental concept of the Mytheme, and ultimately the 
possibility that Heidegger is the thinker of the National Socialist movement. He takes 
issue with both the context of Heidegger’s analysis and than the implications of his 
method.  
In his reading of Hölderlin, Heidegger remains attached to the nationalistic ideals 
of being ontologically rooted in German soil, though he rejects the bloody and 
discriminatory biologism of the Nazis. Because of his commitment to Heimat, or 
homeland, in his interpretations, it is necessary to consider Heidegger’s interpretation of 
Hölderlin in the context of the political climate as it manifests itself and forms a motif in 
his analysis. Without wholly reducing his poetic thought to party politics, Lacoue-
Labarthe believes that the importance of Heidegger’s poetic thought lies in its 
connection to the essential thought of National Socialism. He writes, “The proposition 
“Heidegger is the thinker of National Socialism” means that Heidegger attempted to 
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think—and he is probably the only one to do so—the unthought of National Socialism, 
what he himself called in 1935 “the inner truth and greatness of the Movement.”
93
 
Whereas Adorno took issue with Heidegger’s hero-worshipping of poets, Lacoue-
Labarthe problematizes his mythologizing of poetry itself towards the aim of 
establishing this inner greatness. He goes on to suggest that Hölderlin must be 
interpreted in a very different way and scrutinizes the relevant writings of Alain Badiou 
to this end. 
In the Prologue, Lacoue-Labarthe seeks to clarify the influences that shape 
Heidegger’s concept of beginning. For Heidegger, “The fundamental error… is the 
opinion that the inception of history is primitive and backward, clumsy and weak. The 
opposite is true. The inception is what is most uncanny and the most violent.”
94
 Lacoue-
Labarthe points out that even though Heidegger has distanced himself from the National 
Socialist party, this statement is “somber” because of the obvious aesthetico-politico 
echo of a statement combining the origin of “knowledge” of the glorious inception of 
Greek history with “mythology” if the dream of German ideology was to invent a 
national myth characterized by the mimetic relationship between the Modern and the 
Ancient. Lacoue-Labarthe writes here that creation of a myth was deemed to be the only 
way to constitute an origin for the German “historial Dasein”, as Heidegger would 
phrase it. The dream of instituting a national myth is also illustrated by Wagner, 
Nietzsche, and of course the Nationalist Socialist project. Lacoue-Labarthe briefly 
defends Heidegger here, noting that is impossible to confuse Heidegger’s actual 
positions with those of the Nazis.  
He then moves on to develop the idea of the beginning, or Anfang, even further. 
First he identifies the term ‘mythology’ as a hapax, or a term that only occurs once, in 
Heidegger’s writings on the Ur-Geschichte, an idea about the transcendental beginning 
of history he first presented in Being and Time.  
Heidegger emphasized the need to find an origin of the spiritual-historical 
Dasein, and suggested it could be found in the irruption of Greek philosophy. This 
irruption, for Heidegger, represents the first time that a people rose up to “face beings as 
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a whole… as the beings that they are”.  Lacoue-Labarthe asks what the implications of 
“placing oneself” under the Greek beginning are, and Heidegger answered that this 
beginning is a-temporal in that it “stands there as the distant injunction that orders us to 
recapture its greatness” despite it’s historical context.
95
  Lacoue-Labarthe compares this 
to the notion of Dasein as put forth in Being and Time, in terms of its a-temporal 
characteristics and inability to be exhausted. The parallel between the Anfang and the 
Dasein is, “why the opening of History, the rebeginning, is a repetition or retrieval of 
what did not yet arrive or begin.”
96
 Lacoue-Labarthe seems to argue that this represents 
the movement of techne from ontology of work to that of art. From this point on in the 
prologue, he is able to explicate the ways in which Heidegger equalizes art, origin, 
history, and myth. If the Ur-Geschichte as the origin of History is a matter of 
mythology, as Heidegger says, than art is essentially myth in its ability to characterize 
the beginning.  
In this way, the mission of beginning has fallen entirely to mythology.  Myth is 
the historical inscription of a people, and the poem is a Mytheme, or that element which 
is essential to the myth. By this, it is originary and capable of characterizing a “national 
epic”. In the Epilogue, Lacoue-Labarthe writes, “Myth—die Sage, in Heidegger’s 
vocabulary—reemerged …because it was thought to be originarily linked to the being-
of-a-people: to “peoplehood.” Myth is the originary poem of every people.” 
97
It seems 
as though this is a Romantic notion. 
 Lacoue-Labarthe then brings up a new interpretation, the “national modernist” 
interpretation, that implies as Holderlin did that the Modern “should be understood…as 
the repetition of what did not happen in the Ancient—and art, or politics, or both 
together, should be understood as the anamnesis of the forgotten or the remembrance of 
what is originarily “potential” but absent.” This would mean that there is no possible 
founding myth, and any “mythological reconstitution is illusory, erroneous, and 
indigent.”
98
 Any “German ideology” is only a representation of myth that is never more 
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than a “confused and wounded ‘protest’”, to use Lacoue-Labarthe’s somewhat harsh 
wording.  
In chapter one, Lacoue-Labarthe takes up the question of the Poem’s vocation, 
and he poses it as such, “Should poetry cease to be of interest to philosophy?”
99
 It seems 
that the best way to go about determining the answer is to acknowledge the reason for 
asking the question in the first place. Lacoue-Labarthe recognizes that Alain Badiou is 
responsible for placing this problem at the center of what is at stake in philosophy. In 
Being and Event, Badiou holds that the Poem is specifically suited to philosophical 
discourse in the “age of the poets” from Holderlin to Celan. For Badiou, philosophy 
should turn away from the Poem and re-devote itself to the initial conditions of the 
Matheme—politics, love, poetry, and mathematics.  Lacoue-Labarthe takes issue with 
this thesis on the level of correctness and of justice. He points out that the stakes are 
immense, as exploration of this topic necessarily involves Heidegger’s legacy—one that 
notes the potential of the mutual exclusion of poetry, philosophy, and politics. 
Lacoue-Labarthe seems to hold that Heidegger’s interpretation of myth as a 
means of thinking, which is how he reads Hölderlin, reflects the emphasis on aesthetics 
and politics from the era of German Romanticism. He held the Romantic poets to 
represent speculative Idealism and sought to demarcate Hölderlin from this historical 
implication. The Romantic poets, who represented the potential of German Ideology, 
sought to invent a new mythology with the aim of bringing Germany into its true 
historical, political place—to constitute an origin for a people’s “historial Dasein”.
100
 
Heidegger’s treatment of myth is a reflection of the Romantic goal to create the 
aesthetico-political, a goal that ultimately found expression through National Socialism. 
Heidegger’s position between the philosophical and the political seems to render him 
uniquely capable of speaking to the relationship between poetry, philosophy, and 
politics. In a situation with such severe implications, it is of course impossible not to 
choose a side. 
Lacoue-Labarthe allows that the central aim of Badiou’s project is an attempt to 
make philosophy possible again by returning to Plato’s founding gesture. Poetry must be 
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repudiated so that philosophy can exclusively provide the basis for truth in politics. This 
call for repudiation seems to be referring to the suturing between poetry, philosophy and 
politics that Badiou would suggest needs to be “unsutured”, as philosophy needs to be 
sutured to the other 3 aspects of the Matheme: politics, love, and mathematics.  After 
1945, in an effort to free itself of the political, philosophy handed itself over to the 
Poem—this is problematic for Badiou. Lacoue-Labarthe notes that the poetry of Paul 
Celan marks the end of the age of the poets for Badiou by calling for poetry to be sent 
back to its own solitude.
101
 At this time, he raises 3 questions to Badiou’s thesis about 
the relationship between philosophy, poetry, and politics. 
First, it seems that Badiou’s concept of philosophy is too narrow for Lacoue-
Labarthe, as is his concept of poetry. His list ignores Goethe, Rilke, and others. Celan, 
Hölderlin, Heidegger would have differing lists. For Lacoue-Labarthe, this points to the 
high political and philosophical stakes. Next, he asks if Badiou’s philosophical 
absolutizing of poetry is grounded outside of poetry. For Lacoue-Labarthe, absolutizing 
of poetry is based on the provenance, or native element which the myth promotes. This 
includes the political connotations of myth as the potential to furnish a national identity.  
Finally, he inquires as to the nature of the essential link between philosophy, poetry, and 
politics? He does not ask to cast doubt upon the concept of the suture, but rather to 
suggest that the Mytheme is sutured rather than the Poem. This seems to be where 
Lacoue-Labarthe believes the politics to be engaged. He identifies the two remarks of 
Badiou that speak to the bonds/sutures and lists three propositions to support his own 
case. 
First, Badiou states that the existence of the poets would have been aporetic 
without Heidegger’s thought. The poets lent legitimate historicity to the thought that 
philosophy was handed over to poetry when the idea of political historicity was abused 
by National Socialism.
102
 Next, he speaks to the nature of the suture between philosophy 
and poetry, and doing so incriminates their bond. He also incriminates the “suturing to 
the political of philosophy’s suturing to the Poem”.
103
 Lacoue-Labarthe argues that 
Badiou is wrongly critical of the poem. Rather, he could solve the misunderstanding by 
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identifying the Mytheme as the problematic element. Perhaps the Mytheme is that which 
is sutured. 
Lacoue-Labarthe bases his criticism on Alain Badiou’s concept of the “suturing” 
of philosophy to poetry in his Manifesto for Philosophy. He identifies that it is Badiou’s 
aim “to make philosophy possible once again by taking a step beyond the declaration of 
its end.”
104
 For Badiou, this necessitates another event like Plato’s ‘surgical removal’ of 
poetry from philosophy—an “unsuturing” of philosophy from its relationship with 
poetry.  
For Lacoue-Labarthe, Badiou leaves out the fact that philosophy’s problematic 
relationship with poetry, which is present even in the very beginning of philosophy, is a 
result of the origin of poetry, or myth. 
105
 Badiou wrongly believes philosophy to have 
been sutured to the poem in the age of the poets. Lacoue-Labarthe suggests that 
philosophy is historically sutured to the Mytheme, and that such a suturing has brought 
about consequences for poetry, philosophy, and politics. 
106
 
Lacoue-Labarthe goes onto say that philosophy’s refusal of myth, first 
represented by Plato, was repeated in the 18
th
 century by Immanuel Kant in his Critique. 
Through his critique of metaphysics, Kant brought about “the first anamnesis of 
philosophy and, therefore, the first repercussion after the fact…of the Platonic decision” 
to separate myth from of philosophy.
107
 It is this anamnesis, or recollection, that seems 
to have prepared the reactionary ground for the Romanticist project. 
108
As Lacoue-
Labarthe sees it, this Romantic pursuit of a new mythological religion led inevitably to 
the National Socialist politics of the 1930s, as well as to the poetic thinking of 
Heidegger. 
So the suture does not join poetry and philosophy so much as it joins philosophy 
and myth, a connection that has dangerous implications when considered in terms of 
Nazi ideology. Lacoue-Labarthe traces the historical development of National Socialism 
out of German Romanticism. He summarizes the Romantic project by citing Schelling, 
“Philosophy was born and nourished by poetry in the infancy of knowledge; we may 
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thus expect them, on completion, to flow back like so many individual streams into the 
universal ocean of poetry from which they took their source… a new mythology is itself 
to arise…”
109
 The making of myth is the foundation of the State, and so the creator of 
the Mytheme plays a political role without being directly involved in the political, 
himself.  
The suturing that Heidegger speaks to in his separation from Nazism is not only 
a suturing of philosophy and poetry, but also a “suturing to the political of philosophy’s 
suturing to the Poem”.
110
 Since the Poem is a Mytheme for Heidegger, the withdrawal is 
not a separation from politics. It seems that the political and the poetical are linked 
further by his withdrawal. As Lacoue-Labarthe writes in the epilogue, “Every 
withdrawal traces and draws out that from which it withdraws.”
111
 The emphasis 
changes —not from politics to poetry but from politics as poetry to myth. The 
connection between politics and poetry is strengthened through myth. While Badiou sees 
that Heidegger is “handing philosophy over to poetry”, Lacoue-Labarthe sees it as 
handing philosophy and poetry together over to Myth and that is what makes Heidegger, 
though not simply a Nazi, the thinker of National Socialism.
112
  
Ultimately, it seems this first chapter is meant to present the implications of the 
Heideggerian notion of myth as beginning and the implications of Badiou’s idea of the 
suture/un-suturing of philosophy, poetry, and politics. Lacoue-Labarthe does leave the 
end of the first chapter with a question. He asks, if it is possible today to think a Poem 
without any Mytheme, “one that has renounced neither thinking itself in its possibility… 
nor foretelling for human beings what is necessary—that is, answering, for their sake, 
and in their favor, for what is necessary.”
113
 He then recalls Benjamin, who represents a 
treatment of poetry that opposes the Heideggerian one.  
Benjamin sought to get at the “esoteric heart” of Romanticism where history and 
religion coincide.
114
For him, this was the location of the drive to create a new religion 
based on “art understood in its essence”, Dichtung. For Lacoue-Labarthe, Benjamin 
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seems to represent that the poetry of Romanticism necessitated interpretation. This is 
where Lacoue-Labarthe ties the chapter together. Benjamin allows the designation of 
poetry to return to the Matheme, as Badiou suggested it should. However, Benjamin’s 
Matheme is “not the ‘mathematical’. It is the Poem itself, that is, prose. So, Why should 
philosophy, or what remains of it ‘unsuture’ itself from the poem, if at the same time… 
this can engage another politics.”
115
 Lacoue-Labarthe argues that Heidegger’s poetical 
thought is archi-fascist whereas Benjamin saves both philosophy and poetry from the 
political nature of the Mytheme. For Heidegger, the poetry of Hölderlin asks for an 
heroic return to myth, while Benjamin reads it as a call for a new sobriety of art.
116
 What 
Hölderlin is able to present through these alternate readings is that both philosophy and 
poetry are incompatible with the Mytheme and require the Matheme instead.  
In the Epilogue, Lacoue-Labarthe argues that Heidegger enables us to understand 
the “political stakes of art in the modern age” and allows the possibility of understanding 
that techne is what is at stake in the modern political, in the sense that “the one who 
fashions in the highest sense, is the statesman”.
117
 He wraps up the Epilogue by stating 
that the notion of the ‘agonistic’, which seems to have played a great role in the 
establishment of Nazi politics as ‘total artwork’, is present in three Heideggerian motifs. 
These motifs of Uprootedness, Repetition of Greek destiny, and the theologico-political, 
which Lacoue-Labarthe explains as the lamentation over an “existential loss”, the appeal 
to a recommencement, and the listening to the poem as “gospel”, create the foundations 
for the idea of the ‘political religion’ at the foundation of totalitarianism.  
So, the question remains if Lacoue-Labarthe has proven Heidegger’s thought to 
be fascist. He is aware of the fact that his text is short, only ninety-two pages, and that 
this is hardly enough opportunity to fully develop such an incendiary claim. Whether or 
not he establishes Heidegger’s fascism, Lacoue-Labarthe succeeds in clarifying the 
relationship between Heidegger’s thought and National Socialism through his 
presentation of the political implications of poetry as mythology.  
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4 |  Remembrance 
 
 
Having worked through both Heidegger’s writings and the writings of two of his 
critics, I can say that I understand why his decision to do away with the modern notion 
of the subject creates problems from the standpoint of metaphysical analysis. The 
modern notion of the subject allows for a direct connection between seeing and 
signifying—it creates a reassuring aura of straightforwardness. However, I find myself 
still unsure as to whether this new poetic language truly rids itself of any trace of 
subjectivity, as Heidegger claims it does. I wonder if it is possible for there to be a 
structure of the self that is allowed within the poem. If there were room for the notion of 
the self within poetry, would it really hinder the poem’s ability to carry out ontological 
saying? In her essay, Poetic Subjectivity and the Elusiveness of Being, Jennifer Gosetti-
Ferencei pursues a similar line of questioning by performing a close reading of 
Hölderlin and seeking to detect a vestige of self within his verses.  
Gosetti-Ferencei points out that for Heidegger, Hölderlin’s poetry cannot be 
reduced to subjective expression, historicity, or language. That is to say, Hölderlin’s 
verses are not a result of his biological or empirical experiences.
118
 Hölderlin is 
complicit, as “the poet of poets” in the moment of transcending the metaphysical 
understanding of the subject. Like the artist, the poet is tied to his accomplishment 
through his creative production and subsequent abandonment of it. According to 
Heidegger, the poet’s work should stand alone to communicate the truth of Being and 
the founding of history. As Gosetti-Ferencei writes,  
“The poet is not merely a being among beings, but a structure and a shelter 
of the interstice between Being and beings, and the one who can wrest 
himself, or rather is wrested, from the domination of beings as mere 
actuality or mere presence—in order to utter the historical, essential word 
of remembrance and preparation.”
119
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At this point, it occurs to me that this may mean the poet is not necessarily 
characterized by any action that could turn him into the subject. He is passive and seems 
to be more of a medium or vessel than an agent. I think that Gosetti-Ferencei truly 
captures this passivity when she writes, “Thus poetic language, when it is essential, is 
not to be reduced to communication, nor to culture, both of which imply Enlightenment-
humanist rather than historical-ontological concerns.”
120
 History and ontology are not 
the result of subjectivity; rather, they are the products of Being, itself.  
For Heidegger, the author of the poem is not the subject and therefore does not 
determine the quality of the poetic utterance. He writes, “Who the author is remains 
unimportant here, as with every other masterful poem. The mastery consists precisely in 
this, that the poem can deny the poet’s person and name.”
121
 This seems to 
simultaneously confirm Adorno’s critical attitude towards Heidegger’s deification of the 
poet and the notion that poetic experiences are ontological rather than subjective. The 
idea that the identity of the poet is not of importance seems to further emphasize the 
power of the poem itself.   
Gosetti-Ferencei cites the philosophy of Julia Kristeva as she presents a 
compelling alternative to Heidegger’s complete erasure of subjectivity. Kristeva, as 
Gosetti-Ferencei notes, “suggests that every utterance, and thus every account of 
language, implies a subject, albeit one radically conditioned or ‘shattered.”
122
 In fact, it 
is Heidegger’s moment of Gelassenheit, or releasement, that reveals the subject’s role in 
language.
123
 In Revolution in Poetic Language, Kristeva builds on the ideas of Jacques 
Lacan as she takes a psychoanalytic approach to an evaluation of language and comes up 
with an idea that appears to present an alternative idea to Heidegger’s treatment of 
subjectivity. For Kristeva, the language of poetry takes part in a dynamic signifying 
process in which bodily drives are discharged through our efforts at signification and use 
of words. The expression of our individual drives is what shapes our subjectivity, and 
there are two modes of operation by which they are expressed.  
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First, semiotic language is an evocation of feeling or a discharge of inner 
energies. These are the sounds man uses in infancy to convey his basic needs through 
rhythms and noises to his mother before he has access to symbolic forms of language. 
Man uses symbolic language once he reaches the developmental stage in which he can 
grasp the difference between himself and the objects that surround him and 
communicate that difference with words. It is a mode of conveying clear and orderly 
meaning that would be devoid of meaning were it not for the latent rhythms of the 
semiotic that remain hidden in language even after man has a mastery of the symbolic. 
This dependent, dialectical relationship between the semiotic and the symbolic 
characterizes all linguistic expression after the point of this thetic break. Once the body 
leaves prelinguistic, psychic space, bodily sounds turn into a verbal means of 
communication and subjectivity begins to develop. The uneasy interchange between the 
two modes of communication is impossible to transcend, so the subject is always in 
process.  
Kristeva’s post-Freudian idea of subjectivity shares with Heidegger the notion 
that utterance in the form of speech is not the pivotal moment of language. Rather, 
primal significations that are revealed in poetic language illustrate the ways in which 
language can disclose itself in a moment of Gelassenheit. This echoes Heidegger’s 
assertion that “language speaks”. Both also share the idea that language extends beyond 
its communicative function to convey something essential about the experience of 
Being, though Kristeva maintains that the semiotic presents the possibility of disclosing 
the subject. Both also reject the idea that language is merely a communicative 
expression that is produced consciously by the “self”, or subject—Kristeva’s theory of 
the unsayable is grounded in social interactions while Heidegger’s essential “saying” is 
not grounded in the idea of a body. It seems that Kristeva’s subjects gain the ability to 
communicate effectively from social interaction, which clearly requires a body, while 
Heidegger’s Beings get their beingness from words, themselves.  
The semiotic, essential nature of language is made more obvious by the language 
of poetry. Poetic language is uniquely capable of signifying ontologically because it 
articulates the moment of the thetic break, or the moment when the symbolic outweighs 




of the symbolic. By verbally expressing this threshold, poetry confronts presuppositions 
about the linguistic relationship between truth and clarity. For Heidegger, this 
expression takes place independently of subjectivity, whereas Kristeva would say that it 
illustrates the very essence of subjectivity. Either way, poetry represents a bringing to 
the fore of the infinite realm of the semiotic that other forms do not. 
It seems to me that Kristeva and Adorno agree that the trace of subjectivity is 
located within language’s capacity for expression and designation. Though Heidegger 
noted that language plays a role in the founding of Being, language also plays a role in 
the furthering of Being through human interaction. To this view, the social element is 
what gives language its truth; truth is located in the totality of the communicative 
structure. This structure is what allows the message to be communicated. Kristeva’s 
moment of the thetic break represents the synthesis of Heidegger’s ontology and 
Adorno’s notion of individual expression, and is therefore capable of constituting a 
subject without making the “self” necessary for meaningful communication to occur. In 
this way, her poetic theory seems to me to represent a compromise between Heidegger’s 
dismissal of subjectivity and the identity-driven utterances that characterize non-poetic 
communication. It also allows for the violence that Adorno believes to characterize 
language—in the absence of the paternalistic law of the symbolic realm there is nothing 
to prevent the kind of violence that troubled Lacoue-Labarthe in his analysis, as well. It 
seems that Lacoue-Labarthe was right, in a way, to point out that the ambiguity inherent 
in Heidegger’s linguistic program creates the potential for a certain violence. However, 
as Gosetti-Ferencei points out, the fascism of which Lacoue-Labarthe accuses Heidegger 
hardly seems driven by semiotic and primal urges; rather, it seems almost wholly 
symbolic in its ideology and obsessive in its adherence to history.
124
 The dialectical 
relationship between the two seems to be furthered by the suggestion that the semiotic 
represents that which is most flexible and innate while fascism is unmoving and 
imposing. The question remains whether the consequences of a return to the semiotic 
prove the importance of the symbolic or suggest that the truth of Being is ambiguous 
and violent and the symbolic represents the failure to suppress it.  
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However, it is important to note that not all poetry succeeds in venturing beyond 
subjectivity in Heidegger’s view. Rainer Maria Rilke’s poetry, especially his Duino 
Elegies, did not receive the appreciation that Heidegger afforded Hölderlin. He wrote in 
a 1982 lecture on Parmenides that Rilke’s concept of the Open did not come close to the 
aletheia that poetry is required to perform to speak being.  
“What Rilke terms “the Open”, principally in the eighth of his 
Duino Elegies, has nothing but the sound of the same words in common 
with what the thinking of the essence of aletheia comprehends in the term 
“the Open”. A brief explanation of what Rilke means by “the Open” can 
assist us to form a more stable concept and to be ready for a more clarified 
contemplation of what is thought in the essential realm of aletheia by 
means of a resolute differentiation from the Rilkean word. […] It is 
necessary only to point out unambiguously, that Rilke’s naming of “the 
Open” is different in every respect from what is conceived concerning “the 
Open” in its essential relation to aletheia and from what is to be conceived 
in terms of a conceptual question.”  
On the continuum between the semiotic and the symbolic, the poem falls closer 
to the semiotic while the essay is the closest to wholly symbolic as it is possible to be 
while still maintaining a dimension of the philosophical. For Kristeva, it is because of 
poetry that the thetic moment has not taken all communication and rendered it totally 
symbolic.  By this, poetry is able to illuminate the ineffability of Being by creating 
infinite linguistic possibilities through the shattering of syntax.
125
 It seems to me that 
because man is capable of composing poetry in this way, he is capable of experiencing 
the ontological truth of his existence. However, I think Kristeva believes the primary 
function of poetry is to balance the technical aspects of the symbolic rather than to 
reveal truth about being. Nevertheless, both Kristeva and Heidegger agree that poetry 
communicates something primordial by serving as the medium through which language 
gathers Being and mortals together.  
Having read the criticisms of Lacoue-Labarthe, I tend to agree that Heidegger’s 
phenomenological project becomes muddled when considered in terms of a 
                                                        




mythological beginning or return. While I would not deny that a departure from the rules 
of the symbolic does a violence to the unity of the symbolic and the semiotic, I would 
question whether this violence is dialectically problematic for the self. It seems to me 
that it may actually allow the self to exist more truthfully. If subjectivity is a product of 
the self’s unquestioning linguistic activities, then subjectivity comes from evaluating 
objects in only the instrumental sense. This implies a lack of phenomenological 
sensitivity, an ignorance of aletheia.
126
 Poetry places the semiotic at the fore of 
communication to promote awareness of that which must be uncovered.  
The problem with poetry, it seems, is that the scattered syntax leaves the truth 
content of a poem open to too much interpretation. As Adorno writes, “Since the 
interpretation of poetry deals with what was not said, one cannot criticize the 
interpretation for not being stated in the poetry.”
127
 The fact that there is the possibility 
of multiple interpretations seems to signify that there is a necessary trace of subjectivity 
within poetry, and it is this trace which gives each poem renewed meaning for the 
individual. To my understanding, this is the element that gives poetry its uniquely broad 
influence. By this, I mean that great poetry awakens something, though never the same 
thing, in every reader who carefully considers it. I think that the universal truth that 
poetry uncovers is the very fact that there is something to be uncovered, an essence to be 
poetized, within every being. This is the element of commonality that communication 
presupposes, and it is what is most important within the poem; it is more important than 
the words on the page or the poet who put them there.  
I think Heidegger would disagree with my synopsis because, admittedly, I am 
evoking something like the human imagination, which he believes to be an element of 
subjectivity fueled by mere images.
128
  Heidegger agrees that the relevant aspect of the 
poem is not the content, but rather the “poeticized” (das Gedichtete). The content, as 
imagery, appeals to imagination while the poeticized is the true subject matter, or 
something more pure and essential to the experience of reading the poem. 
In considering this question of imagery, I return to Heidegger’s analysis of 
Georg Trakl’s A Winter Evening that I introduced in the second chapter. The poem is 
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filled with vivid imagery that creates a clear picture of the chill of winter and the 
isolated wanderers before they find the plentitude of the hearth. The first two stanzas 
seem wholly characterized by this sort of imagery, and I cannot resist the scene forming 
in my mind as I picture the snow falling and the dark paths. If the poet is able to cause 
this scene in my mind, was it not first formed in his mind? In my view, the answer to 
this question means either that the poet is indeed a subject, as he also possesses an image 
of the scene in his consciousness, or, as Gosetti-Ferencei notes, for Heidegger these 
objects “are the poet himself, since the poet’s word is the “telling-naming”… This does 
not anthropomorphize these elements, but conversely, desubjectifies the poet. The poet 
is himself a “sign”…”
129
 This is how the poet is uniquely capable of conjuring things in 
their essences without participating in a relationship of dominance with the things. The 
poet is not a subject because the things he writes about are gathered as echoes rather 
than as his own unique moods or experiences.
130
 
As the only medium that is capable of uncovering Being in its elusive 
shieldedness, poetry relies on a primordial unity that is unbounded by human 
subjectivity. This seems to me to be the element of poetry that is most mythological—
the continuing faith in what has been lost. The theme of remembrance of what has been 
lost pervades Hölderlin’s poem Andenken, to which Heidegger dedicated a lecture in his 
text Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry. The poem crystalizes the pain of incurable 




The northeast blows, 
Of winds the dearest 
To me, because a fiery spirit 
And a good voyage it promises to mariners. 
But go now and greet, 
The beautiful Garonne, 
And the gardens of Bordeaux 
There, where along the sharp bank 
Runs the path and into the river 
Deep falls the brook, but above 
Gaze out a noble pair 
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Of oaks and white poplars; 
 
Still I remember this well, and how 
The broad treetops of the elm wood 
Lean over the mill, 
But in the courtyard a fig-tree grows. 
On holidays there too 
Walk the brown women 
On silken soil, 
In the month of March, 
When night and day are equal 
And over slow paths, 
Heavy with golden dreams, 
Lulling breezes drift. 
 
But someone pass me,  
Full of dark light, 
The fragrant cup, 
So that I may rest; for sweet 
Would be slumber in the shade. 
It is not good 
To be soulless with mortal 
Thoughts. But a 
Conversation is good and to say 
The heart’s intention, to hear much  
About days of love, 
And deeds which occurred. 
 
But where are the friends? Bellarmin 
With his companion? Many  
Are shy of going to the source; 
For richness begins namely  
In the sea. They,  
Like painters, bring together 
The beauty of the earth and disdain 
Not the winged war, and 
To dwell alone, for years, beneath 
The leafless mast, where through the night gleam neither  
The holidays of the town, 
Nor lyre-music and native dancing. 
 
But now to the Indies 
The men have gone, 
There to the windy peak 
On vine-covered hills, where down  
The Dordogne comes 
 
And together with the magnificent  
Garonne as wide as the sea 
The river flows out. But it is  




And love too fixes attentive eyes 




Whereas Rilke failed to reach far enough into the abyss and was therefore not 
fully capable of questioning metaphysics in his Duino Elegies, Hölderlin is able to 
emerge from the Cartesian frame and conjure a place of origin for being; he can access 
the Open. Heidegger’s idea of the potential of poetry seems completely embodied in 
Hölderlin’s Andenken, or Rememberance. For Heidegger, the act of remembering 
represents the opposite of the modern, metaphysical drive to absorb and dominate; that 
is why Andenken is capable of capturing the moment of aletheia that great poets can 
conjure through their venturing.  
For Heidegger, remembrance, or commemoration, represents a return to the 
determination without dominance that has been forgotten—it speaks more to destiny than 
it does to history. This is the destiny of the truth of being. As Avital Ronell points out, 
Heidegger’s 1941-42 lectures entitled Andenken in Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry 
was presented at a historically relevant time, a time at which he is believed to have 
instilled his talk with a disillusioned debate with the biologism of National Socialism.
132
  
He insists, in his opening remarks, that the reader must not become awestruck by the 
beauty of a poem, as that would mean he were approaching it as if it were an object. He 
writes, “through a hasty attachment to “subject matter,” our attention to the poetic word 
would be immediately led into error.”
133
  
Heidegger interprets the poem’s landscape to reveal the tropes that convey 
something more than a recollection of personal experience; the content is not that which 
is essential. Each element of the landscape, from the fig tree to the women, comes to the 
poet in the form of a thought that has created a marking within his memory. Heidegger 
tracks the events of greeting, sending, strangeness, celebration, and commemoration as 
they compose the poet’s encounter with his thoughts. He believes Hölderlin’s mariners to 
be poets who “must therefore know the heavenly bodies and be masters in reading the 
                                                        
131 Martin Heidegger, “Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry.” Trans: Keith Hoeller. (New York: 
Humanity Books, 2000), 105. 
132 Avital Ronell. “On the Misery of Theory without Poetry: Heidegger's Reading of Hölderlin's 
"Andenken"”, PMLA , Vol. 120, No. 1, Special Topic: On Poetry (Jan., 2005), pp. 16-32. Published 
by: Modern Language Association Article Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25486142 
133




quarters of the sky.”
134
 The aforementioned wind beckons the poets as mariners toward 
their destiny; they take part in the willing that illustrates man’s driving toward his destiny 
in poetry. But just as soon as the wind greets the poet, he instructs it to go away. By this, 
the wind illustrates the ultimate transience—a vehicle for the poet’s willing, though he 
himself is grounded in historicity.
135
  
Because the gusts of wind in Hölderlin’s opening line and the lulling breezes of 
later stanzas represent the fleeting nature of our encounter with our originary past rather 
than just wind, special attention should be paid to their movement in the poem. The poet 
sends the wind to reconstitute his memory through greeting.  This is illuminated in the 
line, “Geh aber nun und grüße /But go now, go and greet.” This Greeting is at once a 
return and indicative of a departure. As Avital Ronell writes, “The genuine Greeting 
amounts to a kind of promising correspondence, a reciprocal promise that aims to 
correspond to the most essential level of the other…The Greeting is a letting be of things 
and of human beings.”
136
 This is a greeting without economy or permanence; rather, it 
seems representative of an uncovering of being. Authentic truth is revealed through this 
greeting, as it is echoed in the poem’s landscape, which is a gathering greater than a mere 
collection of objects.  Greeting allows the poet to establish a nearness in which he can 
experience the light of the true greeting.
137
 For Heidegger, poetry allows a remembrance 
of greeting and therefore a founding for the poet’s dwelling. Though we cannot find a 
foundation in the abyss, the poets create a new foundation out of what remains through 
poetry.  
The origin of this founding is located in the last line, “But what remains is 
founded by the poets.” This famous and much interpreted final line seems to establish 
why Hölderlin is both the poet of poets and Heidegger’s muse. His poetry comes close to 
the origin of Being and creates a grounding for man in the abyss by the passive gesturing 
of the will. As Heidegger writes in Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry, “We never find 
the ground in the abyss. Being is never a being. But because being and the essence of 
things can never be calculated and derived from what is present at hand, they must be 
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freely created, posited and bestowed. Such free bestowal is a founding.”
138
 The granting 
in Hölderlin’s verses is present in the echoes of the poet’s thoughts. The verses are 
constituted by thoughts, and the subject falls away to the passivity of commemoration.   
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Conclusion |  
 
 Heidegger’s critics are rightfully skeptical of his dialogue with Hölderlin’s poetry, 
as his rejection of subjectivity represents a jarring departure from our understanding in 
the modern era. Ultimately, a successful attempt to understand Heidegger’s theory of 
language seems to require acceptance of the increasingly blurred line between poetry and 
thought. The poet possesses the qualities of a thinker and the thinker takes on an element 
of the poetic, though it seems that the two never quite become one in the same. The 
progressively more poetic style in Heidegger’s writings after the turn toward Hölderlin’s 
poetry illustrates this merging. His inclusion of “The Thinker as Poet” in Poetry, 
Language, Thought makes the merging explicit.  
After turning from his explication of the intricacies of Dasein in Being and Time, 
Heidegger’s adoption of a poetic style allows him to identify the thinking that surpasses 
mere instrumental representation. Heidegger’s understanding of poetry as a projective 
utterance capable of founding truth renders it uniquely capable of bringing forth Being 
without subjectivity, as I hope to have shown. The poet alone is capable of perceiving the 
concealed unknown and disclosing its truth to Being. Without poetry, we would be 
unquestioning in our groundlessness—value-driven entities lacking authentic humanity. 
Heidegger sought to find a means by which man could go outside of his understanding of 
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